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ON (CR)EDIBILITY: WHY FOOD IN THE
UNITED STATES MAY NEVER BE SAFE
Denis W. Steams*
INTRODUCTION

"Sharing food with another human being is an intimate act that should not
be indulged in lightly."'
In the ongoing political-not to mention, legal, historical, philosophical,
and economic-arguments about the regulation of social and economic activity
by government, one of the dominant theoretical controversies has been over the
answer to this question: do regulations "interfere" with the marketplace by
creating unnecessary inefficiencies and higher costs, or are regulations a
necessary corrective for the inevitable "failures" of an unregulated (or "free")
market? 2 While this controversy remains justifiably open in the context of the
markets for many products and services, e.g., transportation and energy, the
core thesis of this Article is that there is no rational-which is to say, cogent
and fact-supported-justification for an argument in favor of a "free" market
for food.
Denis Steams is a founding partner of Marler Clark, LLP, PS, a Seattle-based law
firm with a national practice devoted to the representation of persons injured by unsafe food
and drink. He is also a principal in Outbreak, Inc., a non-profit company that promotes food
safety through education, political advocacy, and pro bono consulting with the food industry.
1. M.F.K. FISHER, AN ALPHABET FOR GOURMETS 3 (Northpoint Press 1989) (1949).
2. Compare CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 28-52 (2002) (taking a friendlier view of the need for regulation to achieve
safety through a "cost-benefit state" that compensates for the faulty risk-perception of a
supposedly irrational public), with KIp Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 149-60 (1995) (arguing that much regulation is an overreaction
to relatively low-probability risks that cannot be justified by a strict cost-benefit analysis).
Elsewhere, Viscusi famously argued that smoking benefits the public because smokers pay
more taxes and die before collecting their pensions. W. Kip Viscusi, The Governmental
Composition of the InsuranceCosts ofSmoking, 42 J.L. & ECON. 575 (1999). For a general
discussion of regulatory theory and the most often-cited justification for regulation, see
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-34 (1982) (surveying the major
economic rationales for regulatory programs and identifying the major types of regulation).

HeinOnline -- 21 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 245 2010

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 21:245

There are, of course, innumerable ways to define (or dispute) what
constitutes a "free" market-thus, the use of the quotation marks at the outset is
to signal that the meaning of the word is in play.3 But for purposes of what
follows, and without intending to take the term entirely out of play, I will
(dropping the quotation marks) use free to describe a market that is selfregulated: a market where buyers and sellers are able to act however and
whenever they choose, and to transact business on terms of their own choosing,
solely based on self-interest. In sum, it is a market that, according to Adam
Smith, is "led by an invisible hand," 4 and which, aptly enough, he explained
using the sale of food as an example, writing: "It is not from the benevolence of
that we expect our dinner, but from their
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
5
regard to their own self interest."
The other term that needs explaining here is the "(cr)edibility" of this
Article's title. As used, this is neither one term, nor two; and no fixed or
parallel definitions are intended. What is intended is a multiple and free
association of meanings in dialogue; a twinning, conjoining, and overlapping of
concepts of edibility and credibility, either and both, intended to illustrate, in as
many ways as possible, that edibility encompasses and exceeds, in meaning and
practice, the narrower ideas of a trust in food safety-that state of believing that
food is, in fact, safe to eat because eating it will not have any adverse health
effects. Thus, as used, edibility includes the ideas of wholesomeness,
nourishment, satisfaction, and even delight. Similarly, credibility, the spelling
and meanings of which subsume edibility, invokes the ideas of honesty,
generosity, good faith, and fair dealing; and it anticipates the basis of the
bargain that is (or should be) at the heart of food exchange-I am receiving
what I sought and for which I fully paid. Accordingly, and in sum, the term
(cr)edibility is intended to reveal food exchange as an essentially (and
unavoidably) intimate act that can never be fully commercialized. The
exchange of food, whether by gift or sale, is founded and made possible by
trust of the most extreme and significant kind. There are few things that make
one more vulnerable than eating. Accordingly, (cr)edibility is the sine qua non
of food exchange.
With these meanings in mind, I intend in this Article to interrogate the idea
of food safety by opening the question of whether a rational economic actor in
a free market for food can reasonably be expected to invest in improving the

3.
The use of the quotation marks additionally calls attention to the word "free" as a
subject (and location) of an ongoing, largely political dispute. See, e.g., JAMES A. AUNE,
SELLING THE FiREE MARKET: THE RHETORIC OF EcoNoMic CORRECTNESS, at xiii (2002)

(arguing that free market economics have had a destructive impact on the American
character and community, and that "technical economic rhetoric has been allowed to trump
the moral and cultural meanings of community, nature, work, and the market").
4.

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 423 (Edwin Canaan ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1937) (1776).
5.

Id. at 14.

HeinOnline -- 21 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 246 2010

ON (CR)EDIBILITY

2010]

safety of the food products he makes and sells. In opening this question, I will
try to show just how naive it is to expect any economic market-whether free
or regulated-to create, on its own terms, enough safety to satisfy consumer
expectation, which is to say, enough safety to be (cr)edible. I will additionally
explain that it is precisely the lack of (cr)edibility in the market-i.e., the
absence of reliable quality signals, the lack of traceability, the high degree of
anonymity, and the destruction of trust-that creates the structural impediments
and powerful disincentive for improving the edibility of food. I will then close
by offering some thoughts on proposed core values that, if somehow made an
essential or defining part of the market for food, would go far in making food in
the United States, if not (cr)edible, at least much safer to eat.
I.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A FREE MARKET FOR SAFE FOOD

A free market for safe food in the United States is impossible because there
are no set of circumstances under which a free market could exist in which the
food bought and sold there could be safe, and reliably known as such at the
time of purchase.
Take, for example, a recent outbreak of salmonella infections that was
linked to the consumption of Veggie Booty snacks, a product described on its
producer's website as follows:
Veggie Booty will change the way you eat, while enjoying the finest snack on
the planet. Veggie Booty puts you in the mindset to eat healthier and change
your life, take it on a train, or in your car, on a walk, or on a boat, Veggie
Booty will be your good friend. This is a life changing snack that will help
you eat healthier. 6
Over sixty persons living in twenty states were confirmed by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to have been infected as a result of
eating Veggie Booty contaminated with salmonella. 7 The source of the
contamination proved to be parsley imported from China that, once finely
ground, was used as an ingredient to make the Veggie Booty spice mix-that
is, the spice coating applied to the puffed com snack in order to make it
"healthier." Of course, the person buying the Veggie Booty snacks had no way
of knowing the danger lurking inside the bag. And that is the problem. Despite
6. See Robert's American Gourmet Website, http://web.archive.org/web/
20080727004650/http:/www.robscape.com/files/prod-veggie-booty.php (last visited Apr. 18,
2010). It should be noted that, unless otherwise expressly stated, the foodborne illness
outbreaks used as examples throughout this Article are ones in which the author's law firm
represented persons alleging injury as an outbreak victim. As such, much of the specific
information about the outbreak is based on the author's personal knowledge and experience.
7. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Salmonella Wandsworth Outbreak
Investigation, June-July 2007 (July 11, 2007), http://www.cdc.gov/Salmonellal
wandsworth.htm. Specifically, in its report on the ongoing investigation of the outbreak, the
CDC noted that a "multistate case-control study demonstrated a strong association between
illness and consumption of Veggie Booty."
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the existing incentives and disincentives, both economic and regulatory, an
unsafe food product was made, marketed, and eaten and then caused significant
sickness and suffering, with infants and young children bearing the worst of it.
All of this occurred because their parents had sought a "healthier" snack that, in
the end, proved not healthful at all.
A. Food Safety as a Credence Attribute
There are innumerable reasons for purchasing any given food item, from its
delightful smell, to the fact that it is on sale. But for all the reasons one might
decide to purchase a given food item, no rational person will knowingly
purchase something that he knew would make him sick, or even kill him.
Unfortunately, however, the safety of a given food item is not readily
discemable at the time of purchase. Consequently:
For the most part, food safety is a credence attribute. Credence attributes are
those that consumers cannot evaluate even when they use or consume the
product. Consumers cannot usually determine before purchase, or even after
consumption, whether a food was produced with the best or worst safety
procedures, or whether a food poses a health risk. 8
Food and its safety is thus to be distinguished from a search or experience
good. 9 Whereas a search good allows for comparison-shopping because the
searched-for attribute can be reliably detected, and an experience good can at
least be reliably tested through use, the safety of a given food item can only be
assumed, which is to say, trusted.10 This is because, "with credence
characteristics, the absence of consumer detection leads to the complete
absence of revelation."'" As a result, this most important of food attributes
remains invisible.
There are some borderline cases, however. Bread or cheese that is moldy
could be considered unsafe, and the attribute of moldiness is typically visible.
There are also some pathogens that cause symptoms in an extremely short
period of time, making food contaminated with these pathogens an experience
8.

DIV., U.S.

Elise Golan et al., Evidence from the Meat Industry, in FOOD & CONSUMER ECON.
DEP'T OF AGRic., PUB. No. 831, FOOD SAFETY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES

1, 6 (2004) (citations omitted); see also Helen H. Jensen, Food-System Risk Analysis and
HACCP, in NEW APPROACHES TO FOOD SAFETY EcoNoMics 63, 63 (A.G.J. Velthius et al.

eds., 2003) ("Private markets often fail to provide adequate food safety because information
costs are high, detection often very difficult, and the nature of contamination is complex.
Underlying many of the food safety failures is the existence of externalities, or costs not
borne by those whose actions create them.").
9. Esbon Sloth Andersen & Kristian Philipsen, The Evolution of Credence Goods in
Customer Markets: Exchanging "Pigs in Pokes" (Jan. 10, 1998) (unpublished manuscript),

availableat http://www.business.aau.dk/evolution/esapapers/esa98/Credence.pdf.
10. Id. at 2.
11. John M. Crespi & Stephan Marette, Some Economic Implications of Public
Labeling, 34 J. FOOD DISTRIBUTION REs. 83, 85 (2003).
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good. And there are usually-detectable items like peanuts that are safe to most,
but deadly to an allergic minority. But for the more common sources of
foodborne illness, microbial pathogens, the incubation period is sufficiently
long that, in most cases, more than one food item or exposure is implicated as a
possible infection source. This means that, even after consuming a given food
product and being made ill by it, the consumer has no reliable means of
attributing the illness to the food. It is for this reason, mainly, that the vast
majority of foodborne illness in the United States is, each year, attributable to
unidentified food items. 12
Because foodborne illness is only rarely attributed to an identified food
source, the food industry is able to impose huge costs (or externalities) upon the
public each year while reaping the cost-savings of not investing more in
improved food safety. A USDA report describes the problem well:
Because consumers cannot detect food safety, they may be unwilling to pay a
premium for "safer" food. Consumers may worry about fraud and the
possibility that some foods marketed as safer products are actually standard or
even substandard. In fact, finms producing low-safety foods may have an
incentive to market their products as high-safety; they could charge highsafety prices, and because of cost-cutting, have greater profits than high-safety
producers. If this incentive were left unchecked, the market would be
dominated by low-quality products with little or no product differentiation. In
this case, consumers would be correct
3 in assuming that all products were of
low quality unless proved otherwise.'
And, in routinely making such an assumption, consumers recognize (and
are forced to accept) that the credibility of safety claims is always doubtful.
Similarly, consumers come to understand that the consequences of not being
fully informed about a food product's most relevant qualities are that "they may
consume an undesired characteristic or pay a price that does not reflect.., the
risk associated with the good in question."' 4 Accordingly, because food cannot
be trusted in its most essential sense, it is no longer (cr)edible.
This lack of (cr)edibility is the primary reason that there can be no such
thing as a free market that produces consistently safe food; instead, a free
market for food will always be defined by a near-perfect asymmetry of
information. Such a market allows only producers and sellers the opportunity to
be fully informed, and so to act freely in a way that allows them an advantage
over uninformed buyers. For when it comes to the safety of the food being
considered for purchase, producers and sellers know the relative care (or lack
12. See Paul Frenzen, Deaths Due to Unknown Agents, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1536, 1536 (2004) ("Reported outbreaks probably account for only a small

proportion of deaths from unknown foodbome agents because most foodbome outbreaks are
never recognized or reported."); Paul Mead et al., Food-RelatedIllness and Death in the
United States, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 607, 614 (1999) (reporting that unknown
agents account for 81% of foodbome illnesses and hospitalizations, and 64% of deaths).
13. Golan et al., supra note 8, at 6 (citation omitted).
14. Crespi & Marrette, supra note 11, at 84.
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of it) that went into production, but the buyer must purchase the product based
solely on trust-which is to say, based on the presumed credibility of the food's
claim to being safe and wholesome.
The inability of consumers to reliably detect the relative safety of food
products competing for their purchase ends up preventing all but a weak and
nonspecific demand-which is really more like a hope-for safer food
products. And so the demand is ineffective, and does not, in any sense that
Adam Smith would recognize, prompt producers and sellers to provide, with
"regard to their own self interest," the dinner we expect. This is what is meant
when economists talk of "market failure," where the "individual pursuit of selfinterest found in the market makes society worse off-that is, the market
outcome is inefficient."'15 A notable problem with this utterly sanguine
description is that, in the market for food, the "inefficient" outcome is injury
and death.
B. Competing on Price (and Volume) Versus Safety: A Case Study
In early November of 2008, employees of the CDC noticed a surge in the
number of salmonella infections with an unusual pulsed-field gel
electrophoresis pattern, prompting a multistate epidemiological investigation.16
The initial results of the investigation found a strong connection between
infection with this unusual strain and the consumption of specific brands of
prepackaged peanut butter crackers.17 Further investigation by the Minnesota
Department of Health and Agriculture traced the source of infections in that
state to King Nut brand peanut butter, which had been manufactured by the8
Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) at a single facility in Blakely, Georgia.'
By January 28, 2009, 529 persons from forty-three states had been confirmed
as victims of this salmonella outbreak, with at least 116 e eople hospitalized,
and eight people having died as a result of their infections.
One of the outbreak victims who died was Shirley Almer, an elderly
woman of Finnish descent filled with "spunk, fortitude, and determination,"
who had successfully battled cancer, but then died as a result of eating
salmonella-contaminated peanut butter.20 This is how her son, Jeffrey Almer,
PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MACROECONOMICS 15 (2nd ed. 2009)
16. Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella
Infections Associated with Peanut Butter and Peanut Butter-ContainingProducts-United
States, 2008-2009, 58 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKILY. REP. 1 (Early Release 2009),
availableat http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm58e0129al.htm.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Timeline of Infections:
15.

Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Infections Associated with Peanut Butter and Peanut
Butter-Containing Products-United States, 2008-2009 (Jan. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/typhimurium/salmonellaOutbreak'timeline.pdf.

19. Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 16, at 1.
20. Salmonella Contamination: Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations
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described his mother's ordeal, and how it has affected the family:
It was just after the New Year that my sister Ginger was informed by the
Minnesota Department of Health about [my mother's] positive test for
Salmonella. A week or so earlier she had unknowingly consumed Salmonellalaced peanut butter while in her immune compromised state of health. Cancer
couldn't claim her but peanut butter did.
Now that we understood the cause of her death our grief was replaced by
anger as we struggled to accept this very preventable tragedy. Our family feels
cheated. My mom should be with us today. My mother, Shirley, was a proud
mother, a proud businesswoman, and a proud American. She fought hard for
the things she believed in. She always liked to fly the US flag along with the
Finnish flag, which was her heritage. If it was one of her kids who passed
away from Salmonella-tainted food, or one of the many other contaminants
present in our food supply these days, there is no doubt that she would be as
outraged as I am today. She would be doing the same thing her family is doing
in her memory right now: telling her story in order to effect change.
Her death and the deaths of seven others could have been so easily
prevented if it were not for the greed and avarice of the Peanut Corporation Of
America (PCA). PCA appears to be more concerned with squeezing every
dollar possible at the expense of sanitary conditions and sound food
manufacturing processes. Every company should have a moral and ethical
compass when producing the nation's food supply. In this absence, we need a
cohesive proactive regulatory system to serve as our safety net; too often it is
reactive, if at all.
PCA now has the blood of eight victims on their hands, along with the
shattered health of a known 600 others. Their legacy is now that of a company
that did what it could get away with until their shoddy practices led to one of
the nation's largest recalls. 2
In the case of the PCA salmonella outbreak, one can easily see the
dynamics of "market failure" at work, and how the "moral and ethical
compass" that consumers presume to be at work in the market for food is, in
fact, entirely absent. And so, faced with infrequent and ineffective inspections
(which are, under the current regulatory regime, the key prescriptive intended
to incentivize safety), PCA was free to do whatever it wanted in its pursuit of
its self-interest, which is to say, higher profits. Such things included:
The conditions at the plant, more circa 1955 than 2009, would have been
enough to cause alarm in an industry where sanitation can be a matter of life
and death, food experts said ....
...But its yellow-brick walls hid the array of poor work conditions and safety
flaws, said employees, who lost theirjobs when the plant closed on Jan. 16.
Many of the hourly workers earned only minimum wage and had gone

Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111 th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of
Jeffrey Almer), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press-I 11/20090211/
testimony-almer.pdf. By way of full disclosure, my law firm represents dozens of victims of
the PCA Salmonella outbreak, including the families of three people who died. My firm does
not, however, represent the Almer family.
21. Id.at 2.
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years without a raise. Frederic McClendon, 31, a shift supervisor, reached $12
an hour last year but still could not afford health insurance for his two boys,
who live in a weather-beaten trailer. "If you pay your workers, you get the
best out of them," Mr. McClendon said. "If you don't, you don't."
Using temporary workers also saved money, said Mr.22 Hardrick, the
assistant manager, "but there was a lot of retraining going on.",
But should any of this be a surprise to anyone? What was the incentive to
invest in modernizing the plant, in employee training, and in vigorous internal
oversight? There was none, except for the slight risk that the shocking
problems would somehow come to light. And the problems did not. For years.
In the ironic words of Representative Henry Waxman, a Democrat from
California-words that were apparently not intended to be ironic-he asserts
that the company's internal records showed that it "was more concerned with
its bottom line than the safety of its customers." 23 Whether feigned or not, this
statement of shock is telling in what it reveals about the failure of effective
food safety regulation. If it is accepted by policymakers as axiomatic that a forprofit food company can be expected to put the interests of public safety first,
and do so without condition or compensation, regardless of circumstance, then
it is clearly time to question the seriousness of legislative efforts at creating an
effective regulatory regime for food. This is especially so, when, as here, the
food-product implicated in a widespread outbreak of illnesses is a commodity
ingredient that is incorporated, sub rosa, in hundreds of products sold under
hundreds of different brand names and labels.24 Indeed, one need only look at
the roster of recalled products to realize that the contaminated peanuts sold by
PCA would only implicate the company if a sufficiently large number of people
2
were injured or killed to prompt an investigation and regulatory attention. 5
And that is exactly what eventually happened--enough injury, illness, and
death was caused to finally force the government-here, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)-into action. It certainly was not the FDA that
discovered the food safety violations, nor did it do anything to prevent the

22. Michael Moss, Peanut Case Shows Holes in Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009,
at Al.
23. Lyndsey Layton, Peanut Executive Takes the Fifth, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2009.
24. As of October 28, 2009, according to the FDA, there were 3918 individual entries
with regard to products subject to recall because they were manufactured with peanuts
supplied by PCA. See FDA, Peanut Butter and Other Peanut Containing Products Recall List
(Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/peanutbutterrecalllindex.cfn.
25. Abbie Boudreau & Scott Bronstein, Poor OversightFueled Salmonella Outbreak,
Critics
Say,
CNN,
Feb.
5,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/02/05/peanut.recall/index.htnl?iref=mpstoryview.
According to the final CDC update on April 29, 2009, there were nine deaths and 714 labconfirmed salmonella infections, spread across forty-six states and attributed to PCA
peanuts. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Investigation Update: Outbreak of
Salmonella
Typhimurium
Infections
2008-2009
(Apr.
29,
2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/typhimurium/update.html.
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outbreak from happening. 26 Thus, if anything, this outbreak is not really an
example of a market failure per se. Despite the existence of regulations
intended to prevent the "inefficient" or "non-optimal outcomes" of a free
market for food, PCA remained a commercial enterprise at its most freewhich is to say, free of agency oversight or inspection, free of economic
restraint imposed by buyers of its ingredients, and free of accountability to the
hundreds of thousands of ill and injured consumers who did not have their
infections lab-confirmed or ever attributed to its products. 27 Furthermore, PCA
had enjoyed this freedom in the market for years. Thus, here, the free market
had worked as its proponents intend; it created profits based solely on selfinterest. What it did not create is safety.
II. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF CONSUMER DEMAND FOR FOOD SAFETY

Because a generalized demand (or hope) for safer food is usually
applicable to an entire industry or product category, like meat, there is little
economic incentive for individual companies within an industry to manufacture
food that is safer than required by government regulations. Such regulations
therefore tend to act as a ceiling rather than a floor, and effectively suppress
most intra-industry competition in the realm of food safety. In economic terms,
the regulations thus act as a negative incentive that prompts manufacturers to
invest only what is necessary to avoid non-compliance (or getting caught), but
nothing more. And if you add to this a low probability of getting caught, what
results is an incentive to make food less safe, not more. The question then
arises: why is this, and how might it be changed?
A. The Inability to Profit from Safety
Numerous studies have shown that consumers are willing to pay more for
28
safer food. The problem, however, is how to make safety visible as a product
26. Boudreau & Bronstein, supra note 25 ("Food safety experts said the underlying
cause of the problem, however, is that the century-old system of regulation is broken. In this
case, the experts said, the federal government failed to oversee the safety of products coming
out of the Blakely plant and was slow to identify it as the source of the salmonella.").
27. For, as the CDC pointed out in its preliminary report on the PCA salmonella
outbreak, "only an estimated 3% of Salmonella infections are laboratory confirmed and
reported to surveillance systems." Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 16, at 3

(citing Andrew C. Voetsch et al., FoodNet Estimate of the Burden of Illness Caused by
Nontyphoidal Salmonella Infections in the United States, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES

127, 127-34 (Supp. 3 2004)). Based on this figure, one can reasonably assume that more than
25,000 persons were injured as part of the PCA outbreak.
28. See, e.g., Doris Hicks et al., Consumer Awareness and Willingness to Payfor High
Pressure Processing of Ready-to-Eat Foods, 8 J. FOOD Sci. EDUC. 32, 32-38 (2009)

(documenting a willingness to pay more per food item, especially when technology is
explained); Seung-Youll Shin et al., Consumer Willingness to Payfor Safer Food Products,
13 J. FOOD SAFETY 51, 51-59 (1992) (finding that for each meal that may be contaminated,
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attribute such that the seller can charge more, thus gaining a reasonable return
on the investment in improved safety. As one paper published in conjunction
with a 1995 USDA-sponsored food safety conference has well-explained:
Safety is an attribute of food products associated with reduced risk or
chance of foodbome illness. If consumers can ascertain the level of safety or
risk associated with a food prior to its purchase and understand the true risks
to health, then they could choose among products to obtain the preferred level
of food safety. In doing so, consumers could express their willingness to pay
for varying levels of safety. .

.

. Producers have little incentive to provide

greater levels of food safety, since consumers will not pay for an attribute that
they cannot verify.29
Therefore, despite the demand for safety, and the willingness to pay for it, the
market for food has proven systematically incapable of responding to the
demand.
Unlike cars, for example, that persist as consistent brands and model lines,
and are subject to an array of independent reviews and testing, a given food
product generally cannot develop a particularized reputation for safety that
persists over time. In contrast, categories of food can easily develop a bad
reputation for a perceived lack of safety. One notable example is ground beef,
which has a lengthy history of causing substantial amounts of illness and death.
At the same time, the problem of meat safety has proven to be largely
intractable. This is, in large part, due to the fact that the U.S. system of ground
beef production, which is highly regulated, is too big and complicated to be
adequately controlled from farm to table. Moreover, the economic incentives
that might otherwise be expected to reward higher quality and increased caretaking work in the opposite direction. As one food economist rightly points out:
Incentive problems occur because it is difficult for packers to reward farmers
for care taking, and farmers have no incentive to take additional care in
production or transport to reduce the likelihood of problems at the packer
level. Nor do packers that sell products to intermediaries that co-mingle beef
from multiple sources have market30 incentives to adopt technologies that
reduce pathogens in the plant source.
This is not to say, however, that these problems cannot be both addressed
and fixed.
Take, for example, the very different approach taken by the large food
retailer Marks & Spencer, which is based in the U.K. In general, food retailers
in the U.K. have been at the forefront in developing private label brands that
signal a high degree of responsibility being taken by the retailer over the
study participants would pay fifty-five cents to eliminate salmonella risk).
29. Helen Jensen & Laurian Unnevehr, The Economics of Regulation and Information
Related to Foodborne MicrobialPathogens, in FOOD & CONSUMER ECON. Div., U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., PUB. NO. 1532, TRACKING FOODBORNE PATHOGENS FROM FARM TO TABLE: DATA
NEEDS TO EVALUATE CONTROL OPTIONS

125, 126 (1995), availableat http://ageconsearch.

umn.edufbitstream/33549/l/mp951532.pdf.
30. Jensen, supra note 8, at 69.
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manufacturing process. 3' This development was triggered, in part, by passage
of the 1990 Food Safety Act, which legislatively assigned primary
responsibility to retailers for the safety of the food sold, and forced retailers to
focus on upstream supply chains,32 and to demand stringent quality assurance
and product-traceability schemes.
One result of the "asymmetric liability hazard" that this law imposes on
retailers is the documented trend "in the British beef industry to source beef
through partnership agreements and groups of farmers." 33 Marks & Spencer
appears to have gone further by restricting its procurement of ground beef from
a single family-owned slaughter and processing facility that sources all raw
materials from pre-approved Scottish producers. Interestingly, Marks &
Spencer even goes so far as to conduct regular taste tests of the ground beef to
provide feedback to individual farmers. "This system promotes learning
throughout the supply chain and is mutually beneficial, since it improves both
the farm-level performance and product quality." 34 And, even better, at least
from the point of view of the consumer, the result is safer, higher quality meat
that Marks & Spencer can credibly market, for example, with the following
advertising text:
PLAN A: DOING THE RIGHT THING

We don't sell poor quality meat.
It comes at too high a price.
How can you be sure our meat is of high quality? For starters, all our fresh
meat comes from known and trusted farms and we only use prime cuts, even
in our burgers. We've also been recognised with a RSPCA Good Business

So, for the sake of a few pence, what would you
Award for animal welfare.
3
rather serve your family? 1
This advertisement is about as good an example of (cr)edibility as can be
found. And it is no mere coincidence that the credibility of the claim
successfully justifies a higher price, one that the public in the U.K is plainly
happy to pay. Indeed, according to recent research, private label products, like

those sold by Marks & Spencer, have captured an increasing share of the
31. Robert King & Luciano Venturini, Demandfor Quality Drives Changes in Food
Supply Chains, in FOOD & CONSUMER ECON. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PUB. No. 794, NEW
18, 22-23 (2005), available at
MARKETS
IN GLOBAL FOOD
DIRECTIONS

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/AIB794.
32. Id. at 23; see also Rupert Loader & Jill E. Hobbs, Strategic Responses to Food
Safety Legislation, 24 FOOD POL'Y. 685, 687 (1999) (characterizing the 1990 Food Safety
Act as "probably the most important piece of food safety legislation in terms of its impact on
firms' strategic responses," and noting that the Act was "intended to induce all those
involved in the food supply chain to improve their food handling practices").
33. Jutta Rosen, Marketing Safe Food Through Labeling, 34 J. FOOD DISTRIBUTION
RES. 77, 79 (2003).
34. Id.
35. I saw this advertisement, and was immensely struck by it, while in London the
week of June 8, 2009, attending the 2009 Conference on the Law of Food and Drink, at the
British Institute of International and Comparative Law. A copy of the advertisement is on
file with author.
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market, representing as much as thirty percent of the value sold in Britain. 36 In
this example, safety is profitable, which is how the market for food must work
if it is to produce consistently safe food.
B. The Absence of Reliable Quality Indicators
In examining the failure of the food market to provide the desired levels of
safety, it is plain that the absence of reliable quality signals is one of the chief
impediments to improving the system. The producers and sellers of food simply
have no incentive to invest in improving their products if there is no predictable
return on the investment, and therefore the public is forced to purchase and
consume food that satisfies minimal quality standards-as low as the market
will bear. Thus, foodborne illness-so long as it does not result in deathcomes to be accepted as a risk that one is forced to accept if one expects to eat.
Put another way, the "stomach flu" comes to be accepted as a7 fact of life, a
burden to be borne, and a necessary price to pay as a consumer.
None of this is to suggest, however, that food companies have no desire to
make credible claims about food quality and safety, and to profit from such
claims. To the contrary: I have not once met a food industry professional who
did not express a desire for their company to have a better reputation for the
quality and safety of their products. Similarly, I have heard dozens of such
professionals complain that the reputation of their company had been sullied by
the bad acts of others in the same industry, simultaneously damaging the
credibility of all. This "credibility crisis" (my term) thus comes to affect the
food industry as a whole. The former commissioner of the FDA, David Kessler,
has stated that "[tfhe food industry alone cannot recoup its credibility. The
public is simply not going to believe any assessment of risk that comes from a
source with much to lose by exposing dangers. No purveyor of a product can be
objective about the risks posed by its own products."3 8
That is why the public understandably trusts the government more than
private industry when it comes to issues related to food safety, even when such
trust is far from fully justified. Still, in a contest over whom to trust, the
government's appearance of objectivity gives it the edge.
Despite high levels of consumer distrust, food companies can still come to
develop a reputation for higher quality over time, and thus brand names can
come to serve as proxies for the more specific attribute of safety. 39 "In
consumers' minds the brand names identify the main attributes of the product
36. Rosen, supra note 33, at 79.
37. How often have you heard someone say that they suffered "a touch of stomach
flu"? This pretty much invariably means that the person suffered a foodbome illness.
38. Crespi & Marette, supra note 11, at 85 ("[T]here is no reason that the signaling
characteristics will emerge spontaneously from a market equilibrium" (quoting David
Kessler, Europe Needs a Stronger Food Safety Regulator, TIME, July 5, 1999, at 30-3 1)).
39. Golan et al., supra note 8, at 6.
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and are a guarantee of consistent or minimum quality. Brands are preferred by
consumers to unbranded products because they reduce the uncertainties
concerning 40product performance, quality, and value associated with food
purchases."
Of course, the positive association that builds between the brand name and
the product as a result of its "consistent or minimum quality" will be, of
necessity, based on qualities that are perceptible, which safety is not. That is
why quality assurance programs primarily "attempt to homogenize products
and control the product process to limit the risk of a future food-safety
incidence." 4 1 So a McDonald's Big Mac might taste the same no matter where
in the world that you purchase it, but there is no guarantee that it will be always
safe to eat.
To buttress the credibility of the implicit safety claim made by a brand
name, a food company is likely to rely on some sort of third-party audit or
verification mechanism that is intended to suggest that the quality of the
product (or process) has been certified to be safe, and done so in an apparently
objective manner.42 The Nobel Prize-winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz,
argues that the need for certification arises from an "information problem," and
he gives as an example the call for food safety by the meat packing industry in
the wake of bad publicity created by publication of Upton Sinclair's novel, The
Jungle. As Stiglitz explains, "[t]he meatpackers wanted certification that their
products were produced in a safe and humane manner. They also knew that the
only credible source of such certification was the government-if the
43
meatpackers paid the certifiers directly, there would be a conflict of interest.,
And a conflict of interest there indeed would have been. But that has not
stopped the recent increase in the use of private, for-profit certification
companies to create an imprimatur of safety.
Of course, as has been revealed time and time again, private, for-hire
certifications are not consistently reliable in assuring product safety.44 Indeed,
40. Id. (quoting JOHN CONNOR & WILLIAM SCHIEK, FOOD PROCESSING: AN INDUSTRIAL
POWERHOUSE INTRANSITION 348 (1997)).
41. Rosen, supra note 33, at 78 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 77 ("[F]irms that wish to credibly communicate the safety of their products
must rely on third-party accreditation or government enforcement.").
43. Joseph Stiglitz, Government Failurevs. Market Failure:Principles of Regulation,
in GOVERNMENT MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 7, 10 (Edward J.

Balleisen & David A. Moss ed. 2009).
44. See Michael Moss & Andrew Martin, Food Problems Elude Private Inspectors,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at Al ("An examination of the largest food poisoning outbreaks in
recent years-in products as varied as spinach, pet food, and a children's snack, Veggie
Booty-show that auditors failed to detect problems at plants whose contaminated products
later sickened consumers."); see also Gardiner Harris, House Panel Questions Industry on
Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A18 (detailing how Nestle sent an auditor to the
PCA plant and subsequently decided not to purchase peanuts from the company based on the
findings, whereas an auditor hired by "Kellogg Company and dozens of other food
manufacturers... to assure the safety of the peanut ingredients in hundreds of cookie and
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in outbreak after outbreak over the years, discovery during the litigation
process reveals the existence of some sort of third-party audits being used, but
plainly to no real safety effect. This strongly supports the notion that in the
United States such audits are mainly marketing tools, done because consumers
generally have come to expect this "extra" safety step. Like the "Good
Housekeeping Seal of Approval," the fact of a third-party audit reassures
without making any credible guarantee.
But even in the absence of certification, as a consumer makes repeat
purchases of a given company's food product-say, Peter Pan peanut butterthe impression that the product is safe is repeatedly reinforced by the
perception that it has not made anyone in the family sick. Understandably, this
perception persists only until proven false by news of an outbreak or recall that
is linked to the product and, perhaps, an illness that occurred in the family that
had not previously been attributed to eating the peanut butter. And so,
suddenly, the product that had been perceived to be reliably safe, and was
deemed (cr)edible as a result, is proven to have been unsafe all along.
Our experience in dealing with thousands of potential claims arising from
the Peter Pan peanut butter outbreak revealed that, to most people wanting to
assert a claim, it was irrelevant whether microbiological testing of their leftover
peanut butter found salmonella. Nor did they think it mattered that a diarrheal
illness they had suffered months before could have countless other causes. For
most potential claimants that contacted our office, the fact of some publicized
illnesses having been attributed by the CDC-a credible source to most
consumers-to a brand of peanut butter found in their home was, by itself,
proof that the product had been unsafe, and the cause of their illness. In reality,
whether the peanut butter had been contaminated could, in most cases, not be
proven because most of the hundreds of jars that were tested did not reveal the
presence of bacteria.45 Further, the fact of illness having occurred at some point
in time adjacent to eating the peanut butter might be circumstantial evidence,
but it was not enough to support a viable legal claim for compensation. Instead,
what was required in most cases was proof-of-purchase, along with a stool
culture that evidenced a salmonella infection, preferably serotype Tennesseethat which was associated with the outbreak in question. 4Consequently, only a
cracker products" gave the plant a "superior" rating).
45. There is no shortage of explanations for this. For example, one would not expect
peanut butter to be uniformly contaminated like a liquid might be. Furthermore, the sample
obtained might simply have missed finding the salmonella that was in fact present. Finally,
even if one assumes that a person was in fact infected as a result of eating contaminated

peanut butter, proof of such contamination is just as likely have disappeared into the victim's
stomach. Thus, in the absence of a positive stool culture, or at least well-documented
symptoms that were consistent with a salmonella infection, a large portion of foodbome
illness claims that might otherwise have been attributable to the peanut butter failed for lack
of sufficient proof. This is borne out by the fact that our firm began with over 5000 potential
claimants, whom we eventually filtered down to a little over 1000.
46. See Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella
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minority of persons infected as a result of eating contaminated peanut butter
were able to obtain some form of compensation, leaving them with only one
other option: buying a different brand of peanut butter in the future.4 7
So, like the purchasers of contaminated Veggie Booty snacks, the hundreds
injured and killed by the contaminated peanut butter had no way, in the current
market for food, to select a safer product-even though we know that a safer
product was available, i.e., one that was not at the time contaminated with
salmonella. This is both why and how the market failed the victims of this huge
outbreak; it was impossible to avoid the risk of being poisoned because all
quality claims being made at the time appeared exactly the same. And even
after the fact of injury, the majority of people injured in this outbreak would
never be compensated for their damages. This is the real market for food in the
United States, lacking (cr)edibility and accountability.
C. The U.S. and EU Approach to Labeling Compared
Where consumers can distinguish credible claims from non-credible claims
about food quality (including, but not limited to, safety), credibility in the
marketplace can be, and is, rewarded by increased market share and higher
profits. But in a market defined by equally credible (or non-credible) claims,
the consumer is forced into being a passive participant, and buying decisions
are more and more left to chance. Think of the recent outbreaks attributed (after
the fact of purchase) to frozen ground beef patties. 48 The purchasers of the
patties that proved to be contaminated could have based the purchase decision
on any number of factors, except the actual safety of the product (as defined by
whether it contained E. coli 0157:H7). Whether it was because the box of
frozen patties was on sale, or because the purchaser liked the colorful
appearance of the label, every box of patties available for purchase was
stamped with a label that stated, "USDA inspected and passed," as required by
Serolype Tennessee Infections Associated with Peanut Butter-UnitedStates, 2006-2007, 56
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 521, 521-24 (2007).

47. This is not to say that ConAgra, the maker of the contaminated peanut butter, did
not pay a significant price as a result of the outbreak. Over 326 million pounds of peanut
butter was recalled, at an estimated cost to ConAgra of $1 billion. See Kim S. Nash, Beyond
Peter Pan: How ConAgra's Pot Pie Recall Bakes in Hard Lessons for Supply Chain
Management, CIO, Oct. 22, 2007, http://www.cio.com/article/148054. Of course, prior to the

outbreak, the perceived risk of these costs, and the cost of lost sales and market share were
not enough incentive to prompt ConAgra to make the necessary investments to avoid the
outbreak in the first place.
48. Recent outbreaks linked to frozen patties contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7
involved products made by Cargill (on behalf of WalMart). See Kenneth Li, CargillRecalls
Patties

on

E.

Coli

Scare,

REUTERS,

Oct.

7,

2007,

available

at

These products
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN0726594120071007.
were also made by Topps Meat Company, which is now bankrupt. See Topps Closes 6 Days
After

Huge

Recall,

USA

TODAY,

Oct.

5,

2007,

available

http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2007-10-05-topps-meat-recallN.htm.
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the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA). 49 The U.S. government thus appeared
to vouchsafe the uniform quality and safety of all products so labeled, even
though this was not in fact true. Indeed, in what appears to have been a recent
moment of relatively clearheaded pragmatism, the USDA has announced,
"[tihe mark of inspection is a reflection of a finding by FSIS personnel that the
[meat] establishment has followed validated procedures in its HACCP plan, not
that the pathogen has been eliminated or reduced to undetectable levels."50
In other words, just the fact that the USDA has marked a meat product as
officially "inspected and passed" does not mean that it is actually pathogenfree, and thus safe. So now even the USDA has conceded that its claims about
meat are not fully credible.
Compare this to the numerous government-approved certifications of food
products in the European Union, e.g., poultry, which earns the right to bear the
Label Rouge. 51 The label started in the early sixties when French chicken
farmers banded together in cooperatives to protect traditional methods of
raising chickens on small farms "against a new wave of industrial chicken
production techniques." 52 For an organization ("quality group") to be entitled
to use the coveted Label Rouge, the poultry farmers who comprise the quality
group must request the seal from a joint commission of the French Agriculture
and Commerce Ministries, the
Certifications(CNLC).53 To do so,

Commission Nationale des Labels et

49. The Federal Meat Inspection Act, passed in 1907, mandated USDA inspection of
meat processing plants that conducted business across state lines. Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34
Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2006)). The Pure Food and
Drugs Act, enacted in 1906, also gave the government broad jurisdiction over food
in interstate commerce. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
50. Food & Safety Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., FSIS Notice 05-09,
Measures to Address E. coli 0157:H7 at Establishments that Receive, Grind, or Otherwise
Process Raw Beef Products (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.marlerblog.com/uploads/ file/0509.pdf.
51. See ANNE FANATICO & HOLLY BORN, APPROPRIATE TECH. TRANSFER FOR RURAL
AREAS, LABEL-ROUGE: PASTURE-BASED POULTRY PRODUCTION IN FRANCE (2002), available

at http://attra.ncat.org/attra-pub/PDF/labelrouge.pdf; see also, J. Bureau & E. Valceschini,
European Food-LabelingPolicy: Successes and Limitations, 34 J. FOOD DISTRIBUTION RES.

70, 70-76 (2003) (surveying the numerous similarities between U.S. and EU law regarding
mandatory labeling regulations, and the major policy differences regarding voluntary

labeling, particularly as it relates to the importance of labels accurately identifying the
geographical origins of food products); Frances D'Emilio, Food Cops: Italy's Palates
Guard, SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 2008, at A 17 (describing the intense efforts of Italian food-

inspectors to prevent the sale of counterfeit foods improperly bearing EU designations).
52. G. W. Stevenson & Holly Born, The "Red Label" Poultry System in France, in
REMAKING THE NORTH AMERICAN FOOD SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY 144, 145

(C. Clare Hinrichs & Thomas A. Lyson eds., 2009).
53. Randall E. Westgren, Delivering Food Safety, Food Quality, and Sustainable
ProductionPractices: The Label Rouge Poultry System in France, 81 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.

1107, 1108 (1999) ("The CNLC is a joint commission of the agriculture and commerce
ministries. The quality group is typically a group of agricultural producers but may include

representatives of hatcheries, abattoirs, and/or feed mills.").
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[q]uality groups must present a formal document called a cahier des charges,
an elaborate business plan that gives full details of the poultry supply chain
(called a flhire) from the genetic selection and rearing of chicks, through
product and processing practices, and to delivery of product to retail stores.
The cahier des charges designates a series of quality control tests organized
around principles of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP). A
minimum of sixty-five tests along the supply chain is required of quality
groups seeking the [Label Rouge]. The cahier des charges also names a thirdparty certifying organization from the private sector that will be paid by the
quality5 4group to oversee its performance with regards to food quality and
safety.

And the resulting differences are remarkable.
"All of the fili~res produce a high-quality product that meets the minimal
product and process standards set by the CNLC.,, 5 5 For example, Label Rouge
poultry live mostly outdoors for a minimum of eighty-one days, twice as long
as their industrial-raised counterparts; and they grow to five pounds in twelve
weeks, while fast-growing broilers reach five pounds in half the time. 56 Most
importantly though, Label Rouge chickens are subject to regular taste testing as
a condition of certification, and the taste must be "vividly distinguishable" from
industrial poultry.57 Also, supermarket shelf-life for Label Rouge chickens
cannot exceed nine days.5 8
"Consumer support for Label Rouge poultry is based on understandings
about taste, safety, type and scale of farming, and locality." 5 9 More
importantly, these understandings are firmly founded on the credibility of the
Label Rouge, and of the (cr)edibility of the poultry so labeled. It is for this
reason, among others, that one out of every three whole birds sold in France
carry the Label Rouge, even though the birds cost twice as much.60 In the mid1970s to 2000, the sale of Label Rouge chicken went from less than ten million

54. Stevenson & Born, supra note 52, at 146-47; accord FANATICO & BORN, supra

note 51, at 3 ("Independent third-party certifying organizations ensure that standards are
being followed."); Westgren, supra note 53, at 1108 (noting that there "is no direct
translation to English offilmre," and that the English terms "supply chain" or "network" are
"pale, bloodless terms that do not capture the degree of interrelatedness and jointness of
strategic and operational issues that exist inside this kind of alliance").
55. Westgren, supra note 53, at 1109 (detailing many requirements of the minimum
standards).
56. FANATICO & BORN, supra note 51, at 4; Stevenson & Born, supra note 52, at 147;
Westgren, supra note 53, at 1109.
57. FANATiCO & BoRN, supra note 51, at 2; see also Westgren, supra note 53, at 1107;
Stevenson & Born, supra note 52, at 147 ("certifying organizations regularly perform taste
tests on Label Rouge poultry using both expert and consumer panels").
58. Stevenson & Born, supra note 52, at 147.
59. Id. (citation omitted); see also King & Venturini, supra note 31, at 21 (noting that
the "significant" market share of Label Rouge chickens is due in large part to recognition by

consumers of their "taste, appearance, safety and wholesomeness, and the environmentally
friendly practices used in producing them").
60. FANATICO & BORN, supra note 51, at 2.
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to more than 130 million. 61 This significant increase in market share was driven
in large part by the perception and actuality of Label Rouge chickens being
safer to handle and consume. 62 Notably, the incidence of salmonella in Label
Rouge chickens is less than three percent. 63 In contrast, the salmonella
incidence rate in France for industrial flocks is seventy percent. 64 Meanwhile,
in the United States the percentage of broiler chickens that tested positive for a
single strain of salmonella experienced a four-fold increase between 2000 and
2005, according to USDA-collected data.65 Even worse, in an independent
study done by the organization that publishes Consumer Reports, it was found
that so-called "premium brand" chickens were more likely to harbor
salmonella. 66 Among all brands, eighty-three percent
of those analyzed tested
67
positive for either salmonella or campylobacter.
Given these statistics, it does not take a stretch of the imagination to think
that, if offered poultry of the same quality as that bearing the Label Rouge in
France, consumers in the United States would buy it. But in the United States
there is no poultry widely available for purchase that has anything close to the
(cr)edibility of Label Rouge poultry in France. And that is the problem.
Consumers in the United States pay more for a "premium product" that is not in
fact safer; nor does it offer a "vividly distinguishable" taste. In short, the U.S.
market has failed where the EU market has not, and there is much to be learned
from that.
61. Stevenson & Born, supra note 52, at 146.
62. Id. at 148 (noting that, although "[iln the earlier years of the label, consumers
purchased Label Rouge poultry primarily for Sunday and holiday meals" because of superior
taste and quality, in later years, increasing fears of foodborne illness prompted consumers to
purchase only Label Rouge poultry).
63. FANATICO & BORiN, supra note 51, at 8; Westgren, supra note 53, at 1109
("Salmonella is rare in Label Rouge products."); cf Henrik Wegener et at., Salmonella
Control Programs in Denmark, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 774, 774-75 (2003)
(describing how salmonella was eliminated from chickens in Denmark through publicprivate partnership that made possible the designation, at retail, that broiler chickens were
salmonella-free).
64. Stevenson & Born, supra note 52, at 147 (citing Westrgen, supra note 53, at
1109).
65.

Sean F. Altekruse et al., Salmonella Enteritidis in Broiler Chickens, United States,

2000-2005, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUs DISEASES 1848, 1848 (2006). The study that analyzed
this USDA data notes, however, that it "preceded a new FSIS policy to control Salmonella."

Somewhat depressingly, under this new policy, the baseline "performance standard" is
having twenty percent of tested broiler chickens test positive for salmonella (twelve positive
samples out of fifty-one), when testing one-carcass per day over a fifty-one day period. See
USDA Food Safety & Inspection Service, Salmonella Verification Testing Program:
Monthly Reports for Establishments by Performance Category, available at

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Salmonella-Verification-Testing-Prgram/index.asp.

For

plants that do not meet this not-exactly-stringent standard, their "punishment" will be to have

the test results published online. Id.
66. Dirty Birds, CONSUMER REPS.,

Jan. 2007, http://www.consumerreports.org/

cro/food/food-safety/chicken-safety/chicken-safety- 1-07/overview/0 107_chickov.htm.
67. Id.
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III.How REGULATIONS CAN STIFLE COMPETITION ON THE BASIS OF SAFETY
The failure of the market for food to deliver an optimal level of safety is
not simply the result of lax enforcement or regulations that are not strict
enough-as so many have argued.68 In fact, there is no real basis for believing
that stricter rules or enforcement will, by themselves, be enough to create an
efficient market for safe food. Indeed, the existence of regulations can be just
as much a problem as no regulations at all where such regulations have the
effect of limiting competition
on the basis of quality and safety and forestalling
69
investment and innovation.
Rather than worrying about a competitor doing more to improve the
relative safety of a product-category--e.g., bagged fresh produce-regulations
can impose a predictable cost and minimal quality level that companies can
easily meet and need not exceed. Thus, even if, for example, certain spinach
growers had invested far more than others before the 2006 Dole spinach
outbreak occurred, the outbreak would still have hurt the market as a whole. 70
The same thing also occurred in 2003 when the price of boxed green onions
dropped in one week from $18.30 to $7.23 per box in reaction to the
widespread outbreak of hepatitis A infections linked to contaminated green
onions used at a Mexican restaurant in Pennsylvania. 71 As a result, from a

68. See, e.g., How Do You Fix Our Ailing Food Safety System?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 1 (2009)
(statement of Caroline Smith DeWaal, Director of Food Safety, Center for Science in the

Public Interest) (decrying "long-standing deficiencies that are causing a crisis in consumer
confidence"); The Salmonella Outbreak: The Role of Industry in Protecting the Nation's
FoodSupply: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight andInvestigation of the H. Comm.

on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2009) (statement of A. D. David Mackay, CEO,
Kellogg Company) (addressing Kellogg's role in the PCA Peanuts Salmonella outbreak, and
arguing that the "recent outbreak illustrated that the U.S. food safety system must be
strengthened"); see also Ben Feller, White House: Stricter Food Safety Rules Coming,

ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 1, 2009 (noting promises of "stricter oversight" and a "stricter
regulatory structure" in response to PCA salmonella outbreak).
69. This is not exactly a new phenomenon either. The Pure Food and Drug Act of
1906, and its sister provision, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, are both as notable for
handing national food companies a competitive advantage over local and regional
companies, as they are for preventing state health departments from imposing tougher safety
regulations than those proposed on the federal level. See CLAYTON A. COPPIN & JACK HIGH,
THE POLITICS OF PURITY: HARVEY WASHINGTON WILEY AND THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL FOOD
POLICY 6 (4th ed. 2002) ("Buried in the disputes over federal regulation is a conflict between
local and national food companies. In various ways, federal regulations conferred
competitive advantage on national firms.").
70. Linda Calvin, Outbreak Linked to Spinach Forces Reassessment of Food Safety
Practices, 5 AMBER WAVES 24, 29 ("With the fall 2006 outbreak, all spinach growers

suffered from decreased consumer demand for their product, even though only one grower's
spinach was contaminated.").
71. LINDA CALVIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., VGS-305-01, THE ECONOMICS OF
FOOD SAFETY: THE CASE OF GREEN ONIONS AND HEPATITIS A OUTBREAK (2004), availableat
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/vgs/novO4VGS30501/ VGS30501.pdf.
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strictly economic perspective, those who avoided investing in improved quality
came out ahead of those who had made the investment in safety.
Nonetheless, in the aftermath of such outbreaks, those who had made no
investment in safety were faced with the imminent need to do so, whether
driven by market conditions--e.g., contract demands of customers--or
regulatory requirement. To fend off the possibility that the needed investment
would be too expensive, in the wake of the Dole spinach outbreak, the fresh
produce industry actively sought regulation at first, hoping to control it. Then,
when no quick action occurred on the regulatory front (in part because of
predictable bickering about the best approaches), the United Fresh Produce
Association and other industry representatives took advantage of the delay and
preempted mandatory regulation by drafting the National Leafy Greens
Marketing Agreement (LGMA). 72
The LGMA proposed putting in place a set of minimum requirements (or
"metrics") that all market participants would agree to meet to sell their
produce.73 It is notable that the minimum requirements were far less stringent
than what one major market participant, Fresh Express, already had in place.
For example, the minimum requirement for the "buffer" area between leafy
green fields and feedlots was significantly smaller.7 4 Despite these relatively
minimal standards, growers still complained of "lost acreage due to the buffer
zone requirements and animal activity concerns."7 5 Such complaints confirm,
interestingly enough, that it was market-driven demand that pushed growers to
plant to the edges, despite the risks. Thus, it was the market itself that created
the conditions that made the Dole spinach outbreak, and its numerous
predecessors, not only possible, but inevitable.
But by setting the safety standards lower, and ceding the more stringent
requirements to the then market-leader, Fresh Express, the LGMA had the
effect of leveling the playing field for the rest of the market, and so ensuring
that all would bear similar costs in meeting improved, but still lower, safety
requirements. While a good public-relations maneuver, this was, in fact, a
72. See Calvin, supra note 70, at 29-30 ("The California Leafy Green Products
Handler Marketing Agreement was approved in March 2007, under the supervision of the
California Department of Food and Agriculture. By April 1, 2007, the beginning of the first
year of the agreement, 71 handlers representing more than 99 percent of all California leafy
green production signed the agreement."). The Agreement has continued to be a work in
progress, however, and has gone through several drafts and expansions in the number of
signatories. See generally National Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement Homepage,
http://www.nlgma.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
73. See generally Matthew Kohnke, Reeling in a Rogue Industry: Lethal E. Coli in
California'sLeafy Green Produce and the Regulatory Response, 12 DRAKE J.AGRIC. L. 493
(2007) (arguing that the safety standards put into place by industry are both too lax and not
enforceable).
74. SHERMAIN D. HARDESTY & YOKO KusuNoSE, UNIV. OF CAL. SMALL FARM
PROGRAM, GRowERS' COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR THE LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT

AND OTHER FOOD SAFETY PROGRAMS 4 n.5

75.

(2009).

Id. at4n.6.

HeinOnline -- 21 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 264 2010

2010]

ON (CR)EDIBILITY

strongly anticompetitive move that created a set of largely voluntary safety
requirements that were less stringent than what would have likely resulted if
market participants had been forced to compete in an open market on the basis
of improved safety and innovation. This can easily be seen if one looks at the
requirements that were in the process of being imposed by major buyers of
fresh produce, using their own economic leverage as a means of requiring a
safer product.76 These contractually imposed standards were more stringent
77
than the LGMA best practices, and soon came to be known as "supermetrics.,
Concerned about the possibility of an "arms race" (read: competition) that
might develop between produce buyers seeking to impose ever more stringent
standards, the industry has now renewed its efforts to have the USDA develop
(with industry input, of course) a set of regulations that would apply to all
market participants. The industry calls this an effort to guarantee that "all
parties--growers, packers, handlers, manufacturers and end-users-are at the
table."78 In other words, if the voluntary marketing agreement will not suffice
to maintain the lowest-which is to say, the cheapest-safety standards, the
leafy greens industry will attempt to do so by regulatory fiat, hoping that its
influence with the USDA will work to its benefit.
A similar attempt by an industry to use legislation to forestall higher safety
standards occurred in the aftermath of the PCA salmonella outbreak. In this
instance, the peanut industry in Georgia immediately sought to "tighten"
regulation of this economically important agricultural commodity. Thus,
according to one news story at the time:
A sweeping new food safety measure proposed in the wake of the
salmonella outbreak easily passed its first key legislative hurdle Wednesday as
Georgia lawmakers sought to reassure antsy residents.
The Senate Agriculture Committee unanimously approved a plan that
would require food makers to alert state inspectors within twenty-four hours if
a plant's internal tests show its products are contaminated. 7 9
Despite the positive coverage, the real intent of the peanut industry was to
use these regulations to protect itself. Since the PCA salmonella outbreak,
the
80
percent.
twenty-five
to
close
by
dropped
have
butter
peanut
of
sales ofjars
76. Id. at 4 ("In Spring of 2007, the Food Safety Leadership Council (FSLC), a
consortium of large produce buyers including Disney, Walmart, McDonald's, Darden (as the
world's largest company-owned and operated restaurant company... ) and Publix, launched
its Food Safety Initiative and began designing its own set of on-farm produce safety
standards.").
77.

Id.

78. Press Release, Western Growers, Fresh Produce Industry Associations Petition
USDA for a National Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement (June 8, 2009), available at
http://www.nlgma.org/fresh-produce-industry-associations-peti.php. The current version of
the Draft Act is available at http://www.nlgma.org/documents/New_LGMA_
Proposed_.Text.pdf.
79. Ga. Panel OKs Stricter Food Safety Rules, ASSOCIATED PRESs, Feb. 12, 2009,
available at http://www.msnbc.mnsn.com/id/29160598.
80. Andrew Martin & Liz Robbins, Fallout Widens as Buyers Shun Peanut Butter,
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Overall, this coordinated suppression of higher quality standards is one
which the Nobel Prize-winning economist George Akerlof predicted in his
seminal article "The Market for Lemons," in which he states, "there is incentive
for sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good
quality 8accrue mainly to the entire group . . . rather than to the individual
seller." '
In other words, if everyone in an industry pays to the same extent when
unsafe or poor quality goods are sold, a greater profit can be made by
competing on price rather than quality, so long as the consumer cannot tell the
difference. Such is the case with food products, and thus it remains the public
that pays the highest price in suffering millions of foodborne illnesses,
82
thousands of hospitalizations, and hundreds of deaths each year.
IV. RESTORING THE (CR)EDIBILITY OF FOOD IN THE UNITED STATES

As already noted, a primary justification for regulation is "market failure."
What I think is odd about this justification, however, at least when applied to
food, is the presupposition that the free market might have somehow
succeeded-i.e., that the term "failure" is being used to mean a kind of fallingshort-of otherwise expected success. But if one accepts, as I argue one must,
that there is no possibility of an efficient free market for food, there is
necessarily no possibility of such a market succeeding or failing. Consequently,
the very idea of a "market failure" makes no sense; it is like saying that my dog
(whose name is Doyler, by the way) has failed at being a cat. This requires us
then to be more precise in talking about what it is that the market for food has
failed at doing. Or put another way, what is it exactly that we would call market
success?
The obvious answer is to provide reasonably safe food-or, at least, safer
food. But is this something that a regulatory scheme, no matter how strictly
enforced, can accomplish? Probably not-and the continuing failure of USDA
meat inspection is proof enough. 83 If a regulatory scheme based on the aroundN.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2009, at Al ("The drop-off [in sales] is so striking that brands like Jif

are taking the unusual step of buying ads to tell shoppers that their products are not affected
[by the product-recall], and giving them a coupon to make sure they do not learn to live
without [peanut butter].").

81. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the

Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. OF ECON. 488, 488 (1970).
82. Mead et al., supra note 12, at 607 ("In the United States, foodborne diseases have
been estimated to cause 6 million to 81 million illnesses and up 9,000 deaths each year.").
83. For example, during the last three years, a significant spike nationwide in E. coli
0157:H7 cases linked to meat products has caused a corresponding spike in the numbers of
victims contacting my law firm to ask us to represent them in seeking compensation from the
responsible companies. As such, the firm's client list acts as a kind of lagging indicator of
U.S. food safety. Whereas in 2005 and 2006 we saw more E. coli 0157:H7 cases attributable
to contaminated produce, the next two years saw a resurgence of cases involving meat. See
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the-clock inspection of production, in which no meat can be sold in the United
States unless "inspected and passed" by the USDA,8 4 is incapable of creating
an acceptable level of safety, then there must be a better approach.
Accordingly, I agree that regulation is not the answer to so-called market
failure-but I do so for different reasons than those asserted by one economist
when he stated that:
It is increasingly recognized by policy makers and the public that the existence
of market failure does not mean that government regulations can necessarily
improve upon the unregulated market, especially when one considers the
positive role that market mechanisms such as liability and product quality
reputation play in the provision of safe products, including foods.85
In my view, "market failure" does not ipso facto justify (and presuppose)
regulation as a needed fix for such failure. There is thus no reason to accept the
either-or of a regulatory versus a free market approach. Nor is there reason to
ignore the fact that the market for food, as currently regulated,is in many ways
as bad as an unregulated market, notwithstanding "market mechanisms such as
liability and product quality reputations" that are supposed to play a "positive
role" but barely do at all. And that is the real problem here. When it comes to
looking for safety in the market for food, consumers are not able to act in their
own self-interest in seeking andfinding safer food. Instead, consumers are left
to choose between avoiding an entire product category-for example, meat, or
variously being in denial, rolling the dice, or just hoping for the best.
Perhaps then, what is needed by way of a better approach is regulation that
creates a market for food that is free in a meaningful sense, especially for those
who are dependent on such a market for sustenance-which is to say, everyone.
If we were to create such a regulatory scheme, one that restored (cr)edibility to
food, and improved food safety as a result, what would the core values of such
a scheme need to be? Here are four suggestions.
1. Increase visibility; decrease irresponsibility
Like restaurant inspections, the inspectors inside any food production
facility function primarily as the eyes, ears, and noses of consumers-as
OFFICE, GAO-02-902, BETTER USDA OVERSIGHT AND
ENFORCEMENT OF SAFETY RULES NEEDED TO REDUCE RISK OF FOODBORNE ILLNESSES 4

also U.S. GENERAL AcCOuNTING

(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02902.pdf (providing an in-depth
discussion of the failure of meat inspection in the United States; among the many GAO
findings was that "FSIS is not ensuring that all plants' HACCP plans meet regulatory
requirements and, as a result, consumers may be unnecessarily exposed to unsafe foods").
84. The Federal Meat Inspection Act requires, among other things, that "all meat food
products prepared for commerce" be subject to inspection "at all times, by day or night," and
that no meat can be sold unless "inspectors shall mark, stamp, tag, or label as 'inspected and
passed' all such products found to be not adulterated." 21 U.S.C. § 606 (2006).
85. John M. Antle, Benefits and Costs ofFood Safety Regulation, 24 FOOD POL'Y 605,
606 (1999).

HeinOnline -- 21 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 267 2010

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 21:245

surrogates for the public at large that make an otherwise hidden (or mostly
hidden) production process visible. And so, as with restaurant inspections, we
accept as true that food producers would, if not inspected, "shirk in their efforts
to maintain good hygiene, and customers would generally have little idea that
their [food] may have been prepared without meeting appropriate health
standards."86 Compared to restaurant inspections, however, the level of
visibility in the market for food as a whole is quite low. Indeed, as was pointed
out repeatedly in the wake of the PCA salmonella outbreak, and both the
Banquet Pot Pie and Peter Pan Peanut Butter salmonella outbreaks, the
deplorably decrepit and dirty conditions at the food production facilities were
only revealed as a result of the outbreak having spurred an investigation. 87 The
resulting visibility created by these inspections was predictably damaging to the
reputations of these companies, and the value of their brands. It is thus ironic
that, in seeking to restore its reputation, ConAgra invites the public to make a
kind of virtual inspection of its 88
peanut butter plant as "evidence" that the
products made there are (cr)edible.
One predictably proffered solution to this problem is the call to hire more
inspectors. But what if we instead mandated the installation of video cameras
throughout every food plant and streamed the video online for anyone to watch,
twenty-four hours a day. Recall the huge public uproar, and swift policy
changes, that followed the release of video of "downer" cattle being abused at a

86. Ginger She Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Case in Support of RestaurantHygiene Grade
Cards, 20 CHOICES 97, 97 (2005) (arguing that the key goal of posting inspection results in
the form of grade cards is to provide consumers information about restaurant hygiene,
thereby increasing the economic incentive for hygienic behavior).
87. For example, when the FDA investigated the facility in Sylvester, Georgia where
ConAgra manufactured its peanut butter, after the plant had already been sanitized and
substantially repaired, it found, among other things, that "effective measures are not being
taken to exclude pests from the processing areas and protect against the contamination of
food on the premises by pests; [and] failure to store cleaned and sanitized portable
equipment in a location and manner which protects food-contact surfaces from
contamination .....
FOOD &DRUG ADMIN., FEI No. 1038538, ESTABLISHMENT INSPECTION
REPORT, CoNAGRA FOODS (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/ ORA/UCM133012.pdf. Similarly, when the USDA inspected the plant
where ConAgra manufactured pot pies they found enough violations to justify threatening to
close the plant. Notice of Intended Enforcement from U.S. Dep't of Agric. to ConAgra
Foods (Oct. 23, 2007) (on file with author).
88. Peter Pan Safety & Quality, http://www.peterpanpb.com/safety-quality.jsp (last
visited Jan. 23, 2010). The invitation appears on a ConAgra website, along with the
following statement:
We've opened the doors to our plant in Sylvester, Georgia, to give you a behind-the-scenes
tour of our operation-from start to delicious finish. From keeping our peanuts safe in a
room with coded locks to quality-control inspections and rigorous taste tests, Peter Pan ®
wants you to know we are committed to giving all of our families the safest and most
wholesome peanut butter we possibly can.

Id. One wonders whether ConAgra would be willing to put a live video-feed on its website
instead, a much more credible bit of evidence.
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California meat plant.89 To obtain the video, the Humane Society had to sneak
someone inside the plant to secretly record the offending conduct. With video
cameras always in place no such secrecy would be necessary. And with the
food producers knowing that the public was always watching, one can only
expect that most of the shocking conditions that are found after the fact of an
outbreak would be less likely to occur in the first place. Also, food production
inspectors could then conduct inspections more like restaurant inspectors:
making surprise inspections that are a complete, multi-day audit of the entire
operation. This would be similar to what the FSIS does now, after the fact, in
response to an outbreak or other significant public health threat. In this way,
inspections are likely to be more effective and probably cost less over time.
And the government might restore its own credibility.
2. Increase accountability; decrease externalities
As has already been argued above, the inability of consumers to reliably
detect quality attributes, especially safety, is one of the chief impediments to a
well-functioning market for food. While I can reliably locate a bag of Dole
brand baby spinach, I have no way to reliably locate spinach that is free of
deadly pathogens. In fact, there is no way of knowing how and where the
spinach commingled in the bag was grown and processed, or whether the water
used to irrigate or wash it was tested for pathogens. Thus when Ruby Trautz
stood in her local grocery store deciding what bag of spinach to buy, she did
not know that her life depended on the choice she made. 9' She also did not
know that, even though the bag carried the Dole brand, Dole neither grew the
spinach, nor sourced or processed it.
In the litigation that resulted from the Dole spinach outbreak, there was
significant delay attributable to the difficulties of determining which companies
would---or could-be held to account for the injuries and deaths caused by this
contaminated product. Under the prevailing product liability laws, no one
89. Andrew Martin, Largest Recall of Ground Beef Is Ordered, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2008 ("A California meat company on Sunday issued the largest beef recall in history, 143
million pounds, some of which was used in school lunch programs, Department of
Agriculture officials announced. The recall by the Westland/Hallmark Meat Company, based
in Chino, Calif., comes after a widening animal-abuse scandal that started after the Humane
Society of the United States distributed an undercover video on Jan. 30 that showed workers
kicking sick cows and using forklifts to force them to walk.").
90. See FOOD SAFETY

& INSPECTION SERV.,

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FSIS DIRECTIVE

5100.1 REv. 2,

ENFORCEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND ANALYSIS OFFICER COMPREHENSIVE
FOOD SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY (2008), availableat http://www.fsis.usda.gov/

OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectivesf5 100. 1Rev2.pdf.
91. Elizabeth Weise &Julie Schmit, Spinach Recall: 5 Faces. 5 Agonizing Deaths. I
Year Later, USA TODAY, Sept. 24, 2007 (discussing Ruby and four others who died as a
result of eating contaminated spinach). My law firm represented the families of Ms. Trautz,
as well as June Dunning and Betty Howard. The views expressed here and throughout are
solely my own. I do not in any way here speak on behalf of these families.
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participant in the chain of distribution for a product is primarily accountable for
its safety, leaving all such participants free to point the finger at another. 92 In
fact, the only market participant who is guaranteed accountable is the
consumer, who will necessarily pay the price if the food she eats is
contaminated or otherwise unsafe. The proverbial "buck" for food safety in the
United States right now stops primarily with the consumer. It is only when the
consumer is able to determine the source of her food poisoning and hold
someone else legally liable for her damages that the person responsible for
causing the food to be unsafe is held accountable. But the vast majority of
foodbome illness in the United States is not linked to any identified food
item, 93 and thus its manufacturer pays no price for the illness at all. The public
pays the price instead through, for example, the $6.9 billion in medical costs,
productivity losses, and the costs of premature death each year attributable to
just five pathogens. 94
Given the lack of accountability in the market, where companies
responsible for causing foodborne illness not only do not pay, but in fact profit
from failing to prevent such illnesses, it seems clear that increasing the
likelihood of accountability can only increase the amount of safety. This is the
approach taken, in part, by the U.K, which has assigned responsibility for food
safety, and thus accountability for its lack, primarily to retailers. 95 In contrast,
92. In actuality, it is the insurance companies-who have the right to hire defense
counsel and control the defense of the case-that eagerly attribute fault to another's insurer.
The further distorting effects of insurance will, however, need to be a topic for another day.
93. See, e.g., Michael Batz et al., AttributingIllness to Food, II EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 993, 995 (2005) ("Reported outbreaks represent only a small proportion of those
that occur, and the degree of underreporting may vary geographically and temporally"); Paul
D. Frenzen, Deaths Due to Unknown FoodborneAgents, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
1536, 1536 (2004) ("Reported outbreaks probably account for only a small proportion of
deaths from unknown foodborne agents because most foodbome outbreaks are never
recognized or reported."); Mead et al., supra note 12, at 607 (finding that the vast majority of
the 76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths that occur annually are
never attributed to a specific source).
94. Stephen R. Crutchfield & Tanya Roberts, Food Safety Efforts Accelerate in the
1990's, 23 FOOD REv. 44, 44-49 (2000). This figure excludes "costs such as: (1) pain,
suffering, and lost leisure time of the victim and her/his family, (2) lost business and costs
and liabilities of lawsuits affecting agriculture and the food industry, (3) the value of selfprotective behaviors undertaken by industry and consumers, and (4) resources spent by
Federal, State, and local governments to investigate the source and epidemiology of the
outbreak." JEAN C.BUZBY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REP. No. 741, BACTERIAL
FOODBORNE DISEASE: MEDICAL COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY LOSSES 72 (1996). But when a
willingness-to-pay analysis is applied to the seventy-six million acute foodbome illnesses
that occur each year, the estimated societal costs "total[I $1.4 trillion, compared to the last
ERS estimate of $6.9 billion for five pathogens causing food-borne illness." Tanya Roberts,
WTP Estimates of the Societal Costs of US. Food-borneIllness, 89 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON.
1183, 1187 (2007).
95. Loader & Hobbs, supra note 32, at 687-88 (explaining that the incentive to comply
with U.K. food safety legislation derives from the fact that a food retailer can be held liable
for selling food contaminated as a result of the acts of upstream suppliers, unless the retailer
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in the United States, product liability law generally protects retailers from the
imposition of strict liability, meaning that retailers are liable only for their own
negligent acts. 96 As a result, there are different levels of accountability along
the chain of distribution, a fact that incentivizes market participants to look the
other way, or simply pass along a safety problem, because the risk of liability is
deemed too small to outweigh the economic benefit. But by making all market
participants equally accountable, especially retailers, the incentive to improve
food safety increases accordingly. In this way, increasing accountability works
to decrease externalities, improving food safety as a result.
3. Increase reliability; decrease fraud
The United States should also follow the lead of the EU, something that the
USDA has done in small ways in enacting semi-meaningful restrictions around
what can be labeled as "organic" and by creating new quality categories for
food. 97 While some might criticize this as trying to create a multi-tiered market
in food, where those who can afford to pay more can purchase higher quality
goods, such criticism is mostly undercut by the research indicating quality and
safety levels would likely rise in the market as a whole with such an
approach. 98 More importantly, it makes possible a reallocation of the current
burden of foodborne illness away from those who currently suffer the mostthe young, elderly, and immune-compromised. 99 Healthy, adult consumers who

can show "due diligence"-i.e. that the retailer took all necessary precautions to detect or
prevent the contamination).
96. For example, Washington's Product Liability Act provides that "a product seller..
is liable to the claimant only if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by: (a) The
negligence of such product seller; or (b) Breach of an express warranty made by such
product seller; or (c) The intentional misrepresentation of facts about the product by such
product seller or the intentional concealment of information about the product by such
product seller." WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.040 (1981 & Supp. 1991). Under Washington's
Act, imposition of strict liability is, in most cases, restricted to product manufacturers.
WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.030 (1981).
97. Jean-Christophe Bureau & Egizio Valceschini, European Food-LabelingPolicy:
Successes andLimitations, 34 J. OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION RES. 70, 70-76 (describing how EU
regulations protect the meaningfulness and reliability of denominations like "organic" while
also emphasizing things like traceability).
98. Joshua S. Graff Zivin, Ensuring a Safe Food Supply: The Importance of
Heterogeneity, 4 J. OF AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1 (2006); cf Stevenson & Born, supra
note 52, at 149 (noting how the government policies underlying Label Rouge seek to support

"differentiating food products through quality certification and marketing," unlike U.S.
policies that tend toward only the support of "production of undifferentiated bulk agricultural
commodities").
99. Zivin, supra note 98. The benefit of having a certified higher-quality product
might not only be restricted to those of higher incomes if one imagines, like with Label
Rouge chickens in France, that its purchase becomes not just about safety, but about the
enjoyment of its other preferred qualities like taste. One can thus imagine that the purchase
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wish to voluntarily assume certain risks related to food by, for example, eating
industrially produced ground beef that is cooked to rare, should be allowed to
do so. But that does not mean that others-especially those who are
vulnerable-should be forced to choose between not eating ground beef and
sterilizing it first.
The only way out of this dilemma is to increase reliability in the market
through the creation of strict standards that can be certified in a way that is
credible. This requires us to recognize that the government's role is crucial
because only it can "protect the integrity and legitimacy of the
[certification]." ' °0 In this way we will allow manufacturers to profit from the
sale of safer food while preventing competitors from profiting from the
fraudulent sale of unsafe food as safe. Like the chicken producers who earn the
right to use the Label Rouge and can thus charge a premium for the product,
and retailers in Norway who are able to label broiler chickens "salmonella
free," in a market where safety and quality are profitable, there will be no
shortage of producers willing to make the necessary investments. And that,
most certainly, is how an efficient free market for food should actually work.
4. Increase traceability; decrease anonymity
Finally, there is the important issue of traceability--or, in the case of the
United States, the stunning lack of it. And this despite the fact that it has been
shown that,
although [traceability] does not directly act on food safety, it can do
so indirectly. This is because traceability makes it possible to
identify the source of food safety problems with some chance of
success, reducing anonymity. Hence, traceability may mitigate
suboptimal results due to asymmetric information amongst buyers
and suppliers by allowing for the use of explicit and implicit
incentives along food supply chains. 101
Put in simpler terms, traceability increases the likelihood of identifying the
source of a given foodborne illness, and this in turn increases the effectiveness
of its removal from the market. Such identification also increases the likelihood
that the entity most responsible for causing the food to become contaminated
and cause illness will be held accountable to the persons so injured. "In fact,
traceability can strengthen liability incentives by providing useful information
in accessing ex post legal responsibility by those involved in the food
of the chicken would be reserved for special occasions, or for recipes that truly benefit from
the other higher qualities.
100. Stevenson & Born, supra note 52, at 149.
101. Mois6s de Andrade Resende Filho, Information Asymmetry and Traceability

Incentivesfor Food Safety, Anais do XXXVI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings
of the 36th Brazilian Economics Meeting], ANPEC-Associagdo Nacional dos Centros de
P6sgraduaglo em Economia, at 3 (2008), available at http://www.anpec.org.br
encontro2008/artigos/200807111109520-.pdf.
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production chain."1
In a market where suppliers can safely assume that the risk of being held
accountable for selling unsafe ingredients is small, and the profit potential of
taking the risk of being caught is high, then no one but the completely naive or
disingenuous should be surprised when consumers are injured as a result. And,
to me, that is the real lesson of the emails that were revealed to have been sent
by the president and CEO of Peanut Corporation of America, including the one
where he directed that contaminated product be shipped--"tum them loose"-and where he wrote in a June 2008 e-mail, "I go thru [sic] this about once a
week. I will hold my breath.., again." Well, apparently Mr. Parnell never had
to hold his breath very long, since for years he breathed easy about not being
caught-that is until his product managed to sicken and kill enough people to
make it impossible not to trace the problem back to him, his indefensibly awful
operation, and oft-contaminated ingredients.
In cases that have involved a branded product, the manufacturer is more
easily identified. One example of this is the 2006 Dole spinach outbreak-even
though, as previously pointed out, Dole did not in fact manufacture the product
in question. Large numbers of consumers recalled eating Dole brand bagged
spinach and even had leftover spinach in their refrigerators that could be tested.
But even with a quickly proven link to a branded product, an effective
traceback all the way to the grower historically has been a rare event. One
reason for this is the absence of any statute or regulation, state or federal,
imposing detailed record keeping requirements related to distribution. Such
requirements are imposed by the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act
(PACA) regulations. 10 3 But the primary purpose of these record-keeping
regulations is to ensure that growers receive proper payments for the produce

shipped. 104
In response to the growing number of outbreaks linked to the
contamination of produce, the FDA developed guidelines to improve
traceability in 1998. One stated reason for the need for effective traceback was
described as follows:
Despite the best of efforts by food industry operators, food may never be
completely free of microbial hazards. However, an effective traceback system,
even if only some items carry identification, can give investigators clues that
may lead to a specific region, packing facility, even field, rather than an entire
commodity group. Narrowing the potential scope of an outbreak could lessen
the economic burden on those industry operators not responsible for the

102. Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).
103. 7 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2009).
104. ELISE GOLAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REP. No. 830, TRACEABILITY INTHE
U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: ECONOMIC THEORY AND INDUSTRY STUDIES 12 (2004).
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But despite the importance ascribed by the FDA to effective traceback
records, the guidelines remained wholly voluntary and largely ineffective.
Indeed, the 2006 Dole spinach outbreak is notable for being one of the very
first investigated outbreaks in which a specific grower was ultimately
06
identified. 1
Only when the market for food has sufficient traceability built in, to ensure
a greater likelihood of foodborne illness being attributed to particular food
items, will the economics of food production begin to tilt in favor of increased
food safety. What must ultimately be accepted, then, is that the deficiencies that
plague the market for food are systemic in nature, and not the result of sporadic
mistakes or the occasional rogue operator held up as the exception that proves
the rule of overall good conduct on the part of food manufacturers. 107 It is the
market for food itself that has failed consumers by depriving them of power
and choice. But the market has also failed those producers who would invest in
safety and innovation if they were able to reliably appropriate the benefits of
their investments. Increased traceability helps solve this.
CONCLUSION
Despite an understandable desire to cling to the oft-repeated notion that the
United States enjoys the safest food supply in the world, the fact remains that
foodborne illness causes injury, disability, and death on a wholly unjustifiable
scale in this country. It is unjustifiable because it is possible to manufacture all
food with sufficient care to make it nearly always safe to eat. In fact, "the cost
of poor quality exceeds the cost of developing processes which produce high-

105.

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY

&APPLIED NUTRITION,

GUIDE TO

MINIMIZE MICROBIAL FOOD SAFETY HAZARDS FOR FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES

38

(1998), availableat http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/prodguid.html.
106. See CAL.

FOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, INVESTIGATION OF AN ESCHERICHIA

0157:H7 OUTBREAK ASSOCIATED WITH DOLE PRE-PACKAGED SPINACH (2007). The
California Food Emergency Response Team (CaIFERT) was comprised of members from
the FDA and the California Department of Health Services. Its success in tracing the
contamination source to a particular field may have been a harbinger of future successes, in
large part attributable to greater efforts being expended by public health officials, like the
CaIFERT team. For example, the investigation into the 2006 Taco John's E. coli 0157:H7
outbreak was also able to trace the contaminated lettuce back to a particular field. See CAL.
FOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, INVESTIGATION OF THE TACO JOHN'S ESCHERICHIA COLI
0157:H7 OUTBREAK ASSOCIATED WITH ICEBERG LETTUCE (2008). In both of these cases, it
was environmental testing of irrigation water and swab-testing of cattle that ultimately
provided the link when E. coli 0157:H7 was found and then subjected to genetic testing that
showed a match to bacterial isolates obtained by confirmed outbreak cases.
107. See generally David A. Hennessy et al., Systemic Failurein the Provision of Safe
Food, 28 FOOD POL'Y 77 (2003) (arguing that for any analysis and policy prescription to be
effective in addressing food safety issues, a systems analysis approach is required).
COLI
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quality products."l°
But to produce consistently safe, high-quality food without increasing the
cost of food to a point where it would be too expensive for large numbers of
people to purchase is plainly a key challenge to any systemic improvement in
food safety in the United States. Indeed, much food is already too expensive for
large numbers of people, and this is food that is relatively unhealthy, and often
unsafe. Accordingly, if we look honestly at the market for food, and ask
whether and how regulation can work to make food safe, we must accept that
food safety will forever remain something to be improved, but not achieved,
unless we can figure out how to get all market participants to invest in safety in
a way that is profitable for all involved.
To do this, we must make the market work in favor of safety, instead of
against it. We must make the cost of producing safe food reliably profitable
while making the production of unsafe food predictably, and demonstrably,
more expensive. Consumers must be able to reliably identify safer food in the
market by being able to distinguish credible claims from non-credible ones.
Finally, those who produce and sell unsafe food and injure consumers as a
result, must be held quickly and consistently accountable. Without these
reforms, food in the United States will never be safe enough.

108. Tanya Roberts, Economics ofPrivate Strategies to Control Foodborne Pathogens,
20 CHOICES 117, 118 (2005) (quoting Michael A. Mazzocco, HACCP as a Business
Management Tool, 78 AM. J. OF AGRiC. ECON. 770, 770 (1996)).
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